It’s time for Canada to opt for Sweden’s Saab Gripen and cancel the F-35 for Canada’s air force

Saab’s industrial package makes the decision to switch to the Gripen more attractive. It proposes assembly of the aircraft in Canada, technology transfer, and a joint venture with Bombardier.

By Fareed Khan 
A version of this article can be found on Substack.

In an era of escalating tensions between Canada and the United States—marked by unjustified US tariffs, trade wars, economic coercion, and outright threats to Canadian sovereignty—Ottawa faces a pivotal decision on the replacement of the Royal Canadian Air Force’s CF-18 fighter jet fleet. The longstanding plan to acquire 88 Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II jets built in the United States has become untenable.

American diplomatic pressure, exemplified by US Ambassador Pete Hoekstra’s explicit threats about altering arrangements under the North American aerospace defence treaty, and increasing incursions into Canadian airspace by the US Air Force unless Canada fully commits to the F-35, underscores a troubling pattern of coercion. Combined with broader US actions with Canada since Donald Trump returned to office in January 2025, including tariffs that have severely impacted major Canadian industries—steel, aluminum, softwood lumber--and inflammatory rhetoric about annexing Canada as the “51st state”, a reliance on the American platform would compromise Canada’s ability to act as a master in its own house. Switching to the Swedish Saab Gripen would offer a compelling alternative with benefits that include: lower purchase and operational costs, genuine sovereignty, industrial benefits including technology transfers, and proven operational effectiveness.

Since the government of Justin Trudeau announced the finalization of the F-35 contract in 2023 the program’s costs have ballooned dramatically. Canada’s Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO) has reported that the projected life cycle cost of the F-35 purchase has surged from an original estimate of C$19 billion to C$29 billion, reflecting ongoing delays, upgrades, and sustainment overruns.

Recent incidents also highlight persistent reliability issues. Two brand-new British F-35s were stranded in the Azores for over two months due to mechanical problems during delivery flights, while another RAF F-35B was grounded in India for more than a month after a technical snag. These are not isolated anomalies but symptoms of deeper systemic challenges.

The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports since 2020 paint an even more concerning picture of chronic program failures. In its September 2025 report the GAO documented that all 110 F-35 aircraft delivered by Lockheed Martin in 2024 were late by an average of 238 days—a sharp deterioration from an already poor average of 61 days late in 2023. Supply chain challenges, parts shortages, and issues with critical hardware and software upgrades were primary drivers.

Additionally, the modernization effort known as “Block 4”—software upgrades which are the foundation of the modernization—is ineffective, has seen costs balloon by more than US$6 billion above original estimates, and is now at least five years behind schedule, with full capabilities potentially not available until 2031 or later. Over 180 airframes produced since mid-2023 have been impacted, with the new software delivering effectively zero new combat capability throughout much of 2025 in related assessments.

Sustainment costs represent another major red flag. The GAO has repeatedly highlighted rising operation and support expenses. Projected fleet sustainment costs, for the US and partner nations, now stand at US$1.58 trillion, pushing the total program life cycle cost (acquisition plus lifetime sustainment) well over US$2 trillion. Mission-capable rates for all F-35 variants have consistently fallen short of targets for years, driven by poor reliability, maintainability shortfalls, engine issues, and the very supply chain problems causing delivery delays. These challenges echo long-standing criticisms that the program continues to “over promise and under deliver” nearly two decades into the program. The Pentagon has faced criticism for downplaying the full scale of these troubles, and as a result Canada risks inheriting an aircraft platform plagued by late deliveries, incomplete capabilities, and dependency on unreliable US supply chains for parts and software updates—a vulnerability Washington would likely exploit amid disputes with Canada.

Even the F-35’s much-vaunted stealth advantage is increasingly questioned with the stealth coating peeling off in supersonic flight. Furthermore, Russia and China have developed low-frequency radars and other systems, such as Very High Frequency radar bands, infrared tracking via satellites/drones, and other developments in detection technology, which claim to detect and track F-35s at ranges that make the aircraft vulnerable. While detection does not equal successful engagement, these advances erode the first-look/first-kill advantage promised by Lockheed in contested environments, especially against peer adversaries.

By contrast, the Saab Gripen delivers superior value. Unit costs for the Gripen E version are competitive, often cited in the C$80–C$100 million range depending on configuration, compared to F-35A flyaway prices that frequently exceed C$100 million when factoring in ancillary expenses. The real savings emerge in operations. F-35 flight-hour costs are reported between C$45,500 and C$69,000, while Gripen figures range from approximately C$6,900 to C$12,400, making the Gripen as much as 4–5 times cheaper to operate on a sustained basis. Over a fleet life cycle, this translates to billions in savings for Canadian taxpayers, enabling a higher total of flight hours and better pilot training.

The Gripen’s design also emphasizes independence and practicality. It is able to operate from short, austere strips (including public highways), requires minimal support infrastructure, and can be turned around rapidly by small teams. This dispersed operations capability is ideal for Canada’s vast geography and Arctic needs, unlike the F-35’s more demanding maintenance footprint which requires longer runways, special heated hangars, and a larger support air crew with specialized training.

Additionally, the F-35 demands roughly up to 13 maintenance man-hours per hour of flight—burdened by its complex stealth coatings, specialized systems, and persistent supply chain issues—while the Saab Gripen achieves far greater efficiency with less than 10 man-hours per flight hour and significantly lower effective demands thanks to its rapid turnaround design, austere-field operability, and minimal support requirements. Crucially, sourcing from Sweden insulates Canada from US leverage over parts, software, or upgrades during political disagreements. Canada would retain full sovereignty over its air force rather than operating under implicit American veto power.

Saab’s industrial package also makes the decision to switch from the F-35 even more attractive and logical. The company has proposed assembly of the aircraft in Canada, technology transfer, and a joint venture potentially partnering with Bombardier in Montreal and Toronto. Public reports indicate this could create up to 12,600 high-skilled jobs in manufacturing, R&D, and related aerospace sectors, with significant GDP contributions and offsets meeting Canada’s 100% industrial benefits requirements. Partnerships with Bombardier, CAE (virtual training simulators), and others would build sovereign aerospace capabilities in Canada that would last decades.

Public sentiment in Canada also strongly supports re-evaluation. A number of polls, including EKOS surveys, show a majority of Canadians favouring the Gripen or a mixed fleet over sole reliance on the F-35, particularly tensions with the US. Many view the Gripen as a path to genuine independence from US control over Canada’s defence. And while critics argue a mixed fleet introduces logistical complexity, this overlooks the F-35’s own sustainment woes documented by the GAO and the Gripen’s interoperability advancements.

What hasn’t been widely reported is that Gripen platform has excelled in exercises against American fighter jets, demonstrating it can hold its own in realistic scenarios while offering far higher operational availability. In an era of drone swarms and contested airspace, quantity and affordability can complement quality. Even Elon Musk and Donald Trump have publicly criticized the F-35’s exorbitant costs, validating concerns about over-reliance on this platform.

We also have to consider the broader geopolitical context which cannot be ignored. American tariffs on Canadian goods, threats tied to border security and trade, and Ambassador Hoekstra’s statements about NORAD adjustments and increased US flights over Canada signal that Washington views allied procurement as a loyalty test rather than a sovereign decision. Continuing with the F-35 under these conditions would reward coercion and effectively make Canadian autonomy subservient to US priorities. By pivoting to the Gripen, Canada would assert control over its defence procurement, diversify suppliers, bolster domestic industry, and save substantial funds for other federal priorities.

The original F-35 commitment was made in a completely different political era—before President Trump’s tariffs, annexation rhetoric, and explicit threats against Canadian sovereignty. That era is gone. Today’s stark realities—ballooning costs confirmed by both Canada’s Parliamentary Budget Officer and the US Government Accountability Office, repeated reliability scandals, chronic delivery delays, endless modernization failures, an eroding stealth advantage, and overt American coercion—cry out for an immediate and decisive reset.

Cancelling the remaining F-35 orders in favour of the Saab Gripen would not be a retreat. It would be a bold, necessary declaration of sovereignty and fiscal responsibility. This strategic pivot would deliver affordability, operational independence, and long-term resilience while restoring Canada’s control over its own air force. It would position Canada as a proud, mature middle power charting its own destiny—capable of fulfilling its NORAD and NATO obligations without kneeling to foreign pressure or compromising its autonomy.

The time for decisive action is now. When it comes to the defence of this nation and the sacred principle of Canadian sovereignty, there can be only one answer—Canada must be the master in its own house.

© 2026 The View From Here. © 2026 Fareed Khan. All Rights Reserved.

To protect Canadian sovereignty from US belligerence Carney must cancel the F-35 fighter jet deal

If Prime Minister Mark Carney meant what he said in his Davos speech rejecting the F-35 deal is the logical decision. The financial stakes are immense, and the cost of inaction endangers Canada.
 

By Fareed Khan 
A version of this article can be found on Substack.

In the shadow of escalating US threats to Canadian sovereignty, the New Democratic Party’s recent demand for Prime Minister Mark Carney to scrap the $19 billion F-35 fighter jet contract with Lockheed Martin has ignited a crucial national debate. The NDP is not merely suggesting a pivot. They are insisting on cancelling all 88 jets, including the 16 to which Canada is already committed, in favour of Sweden’s Saab Gripen.

This call comes amid a barrage of American provocations, from tariff threats on Canadian aircraft to repeated musings by President Donald Trump about annexing Canada as the “51st state.” As Canada grapples with these realities, it is imperative to recognize that procuring advanced defence hardware from a nation increasingly hostile to its allies poses an existential risk to its territorial integrity and independence. In such a scenario the NDP says that Canada must abandon the F-35 program completely to avoid entrusting its air defences to a partner that could disable them at will through software controls or a de facto kill switch.

The post-World War Two era of stable US-Canada relations, built on mutual trust and shared democratic values, is unequivocally over. For decades, Canada benefited from this alliance, contributing to NATO missions, protecting North American skies under NORAD, and enjoying the security umbrella provided by American military might. But under Trump’s second administration, that partnership has devolved into coercion and intimidation. Just days before the NDP’s announcement, Trump threatened to decertify the approximately 2,600 Bombardier jets operating in the US, and impose a 50% tariff on Canadian-made aircraft, ostensibly because Canada did not certify certain American made Gulfstream models swiftly enough. This threat against Canada’s aviation industry was no isolated incident. It followed punitive tariffs on Canadian steel, aluminum, and softwood lumber that often bypass the protections of the Canada-US-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA), which Trump negotiated in his first administration.

But Trump’s rhetoric has escalated further. Since returning to the White House he has repeatedly floated the idea of annexing Canada as the 51st state, a notion he has invoked in speeches and on social media posts, framing it as a “joke” that thinly veils aggressive intent. Such statements are not harmless. They signal a fundamental shift where the US views its northern neighbour not as an equal ally but as a subordinate entity ripe for economic domination or outright absorption.

This erosion of trust extends to the heart of defence procurement. The F-35 is not merely a fighter jet, it is a sophisticated network-dependent platform with its operational effectiveness dependent on US-controlled software and data systems. Central to this are the Mission Data Files which serve as the aircraft’s “brains,” providing critical information on threat identification, route planning, and combat communication. These files are managed by a US team at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida and require frequent updates, especially in conflict scenarios. American policy explicitly prohibits international operators from performing independent updates outside the continental United States, with Israel being the sole exception. For Canada (and other nations that buy the aircraft) this means total dependency, and without friendly relations with the US our F-35s could fly but would be rendered ineffective against threats, much like a smartphone starved of updates the aircraft would be vulnerable and obsolete.

Defence analysts have long warned of this “all the eggs in one basket” scenario, which is a set up for failure. The F-35’s Autonomic Logistics Information System funnels all data through US servers in Fort Worth, Texas, managed by Lockheed Martin. In a belligerent situation—such as escalated disputes over tariffs or border issues—the US could withhold updates, restrict access, or even implement a metaphorical “kill switch” to degrade the aircraft’s capabilities. This is not speculative fiction, it echoes restrictions placed on Ukraine’s use of F-16s against Russia, where the US limited operational freedoms to avoid escalation of the war. For Canada to invest $19 billion upfront—and a staggering $74 billion over the F-35’s life cycle—in a system that the US could neuter, is not strategic, it is suicidal.

Canada is not alone in having these concerns. Across NATO, allies are re-evaluating their reliance on American systems amid Trump’s erratic policies. Denmark, for instance, has expressed profound regret over its F-35 purchase. Rasmus Jarlov, chairman of Denmark’s parliamentary defence committee, publicly lamented the decision, fearing the US could disable the jets by halting spare parts supplies to coerce concessions over Greenland—a territory Trump has obsessively targeted for annexation, even threatening the use of force. Trump has also threatened tariffs on NATO allies opposing US control of Greenland, further straining the alliance. European officials have echoed these worries, suggesting contract cancellations if the US mirrors its restrictions on Ukraine’s fighters. Germany’s $10 billion deal for 35 F-35s is currently under scrutiny, and projections of over 550 European F-35s by decade’s end now seem precarious as trust evaporates.

Trump has also disparaged NATO troops’ contributions in Afghanistan and questioned the alliance’s mutual defence commitments. This has prompted a cascade of doubt. If the US can abandon commitments to Ukraine or threaten Denmark over Greenland, what prevents it from leveraging F-35 dependencies against Canada or other NATO allies over trade disputes? The stable alliance that defined the post-war order—where the US was the reliable guarantor—has been weaponized into a tool of coercion. As Prime Minister Carney articulated at the World Economic Forum in Davos, we are amid a “rupture, not a transition,” where middle powers like Canada must unite against great power rivalry and weaponized economic integration. Carney’s call for “strategic autonomy” resonates and shows that middle powers are not powerless. They can build alternatives that embody values like sovereignty and solidarity.

Enter the Saab Gripen as a viable path forward. Unlike the F-35, the Gripen offers operational sovereignty, with no requirement for permission on updates or mission planning. Saab’s proposal includes intellectual property transfer and assembly in Canada, enabling independent maintenance and upgrades. This deal promises up to 12,600 high value added jobs bolstering the Canadian aerospace sector while reducing dependency. By switching to the Gripen, Canada would signal to allies like Australia, Japan, and South Korea that alternatives exist, potentially unravelling US military hardware export dominance worth hundreds of billions.

Critics may argue that the F-35’s stealth capabilities are superior, but technical edge means little if political whims can result in the fleet being inoperable. Canada’s situation is symbolic, and the NDP’s demand followed Carney’s Davos speech, echoing his language on middle powers collaborating. If Carney meant what he said, rejecting the F-35 deal is the logical step. The financial stakes are immense—$74 billion committed to a multi-generational dependency—but the cost of inaction is higher. A compromised air defence network in an era where the US could sabotage the air force fleets of Canada if needed leaving this country vulnerable to American aggression.

Ultimately, Canada can no longer afford to trust the US as a steadfast ally. The threats of tariffs, annexation rhetoric, and potential control over our air defence hardware demands a decisive break from business as usual. Cancelling the F-35 contract, beyond the initial 16 jets at the least, and embracing Sweden’s Gripen is not anti-American, it is pro-Canadian, ensuring our sovereignty and territorial integrity. As Carney warned, if middle powers do not act together, they risk being on the menu.

Ottawa must heed the NDP’s urgent call to decisively change course on Canada’s fighter jet procurement, scrapping the F-35 program beyond the initial 16 jets and committing instead to the Saab Gripen to secure genuine operational independence. This is not merely a policy adjustment—it is an essential act of national self-preservation. The time for complacency is emphatically over. The defence of Canada now demands the immediate establishment of true independence in military procurement from the United States, an ally whose trust has been irreparably fractured by relentless threats, economic coercion, and annexation rhetoric that has been unseen in Canada-US relations since the 19th century.

In this new era of great-power belligerence, where Canada risks becoming a vassal state rather than a sovereign partner, strategic autonomy is no longer optional. It is the only path to safeguarding this nation’s territorial integrity, air sovereignty, and future as a free and independent nation. It’s time to fly on our own wings or Canada is sure to be grounded by a leash held by a belligerent neighbour.

© 2026 The View From Here. © 2026 Fareed Khan. All Rights Reserved.

Sweden can teach Canada how to build a fighter jet for its own air defence needs

By Fareed Khan

The process to replace Canada's aging CF-18 Hornet jet fighters is now well into its second decade.  The aircraft, which first entered into service in 1982, are currently programmed to be phased out by the mid-2020s when the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) is supposed to take delivery of replacement aircraft from one of the aircraft manufacturers currently competing for the lucrative contract with the Canadian government. 

 

CF-18 Hornet

 

CF-105 Avro Arrow

Since it began, the debate surrounding which company should replace Canada’s fighter jet fleet also raised questions about whether this country has the ability to design and manufacture a jet fighter suited to Canadian air defence needs, the way it once did in the 1940s and 50s.  The last Canadian designed and manufactured fighter jet was the ill-fated Avro Arrow which was abruptly cancelled in 1959 by the Conservative government of John Diefenbaker.

In 2012 a Canadian company proposed an updated version of the legendary Arrow as a Canadian-made alternative to the purchase of American or European designed fighter jets.  One of the proponents of that proposal was retired Canadian Armed Forces Maj.Gen. Lewis MacKenzie, who noted that the Arrow’s basic design and platform still exceeded any current fighter jet, and that it was perfect for Canada’s needs.  The proposal was rejected by the Conservative government of Stephen Harper.
 

This proposal was evidence that Canada does have the knowledge and resources to design and build a fighter jet to meet its needs, as well as the entrepreneurial spirit and business acumen required for such a venture.  The only thing that seemed to be lacking was political will.  

If Canadian politicians and those who advocate a Canadian-made solution to this nations air defence needs are looking for a template on how to take on such a venture successfully then it should look no further than Sweden.  This small nation has been able to create a robust domestic military aviation industry based on the needs of the Swedish Air Force (SAF) for a fighter jet.

The Saab conglomerate has been the supplier of front line fighter jets to the SAF since the late 1940s.  Its success is built on a foundation of aviation technology, a commitment to innovative research and development, a political commitment to the company by all political parties that have held government in that country, and a realization that as a small nation with an official policy of neutrality in the great conflicts of the 20th Century, it could not depend on other nations to defend its air space or territory.  As a result Saab has been the main supplier of front line fighter jets for the SAF for decades.

Sweden is a country with a population of more than 10.1 million people (27% of Canada's population), a geography that is 4.5% the size of Canada's, and a GDP that is 32.5% of Canada's (2018 International Monetary Fund figures).  Yet for almost seven decades this small nation has managed to produce jet fighters to equip its own air force that matched or exceeded the performance of other top line fighter jets produced in the West and by the Russians.  These planes were supplied to the SAF in numbers that were and are two or three times greater than the number of front line jets that have equipped the RCAF over the past half century.

The decision by Diefenbaker's Conservative government to cancel the Avro Arrow, which was apparently made on the basis of the program's cost (but some say was a vindictive political move against a Liberal project), was one of the biggest blunders in industrial policy in Canadian history.  That decision resulted in more than 15,000 well-paid and highly educated Canadian workers immediately losing their jobs with another 25,000 jobs lost in the supply chain, in spin-off and support industries, and in businesses that depended on the buying power of those aviation industry workers.  In addition, the cancellation resulted in the loss of tens of thousands of potential future jobs that would have been created through further innovation and evolution of the technology developed by Avro.
    

CF-101 Voodoo

The replacements for the Arrow -- the Bomarc missile, CF-101 Voodoo, and the CF-104 Starfighter -- not only did not meet the performance specifications that the RCAF had for the Arrow, but also ended up costing significantly more in the long run than if Canada had purchased the Arrow for the RCAF.

Squadron of CF-104 Starfighters

One of the reasons often given by critics as to why Canada can't design and build jet fighters for the RCAF today is that Canada does not have the technological capacity or deep enough pockets as a government to finance a fighther aircraft from design to production to operation.  This is despite the fact that Canada's aerospace industry was ranked third in terms of revenue and fifth in terms of civil aircraft production in the world in 2018.  In addition, Canada's largest aerospace company -- Bombardier -- has been on the leading edge of innovative aircraft design when it comes to civil aircraft for years, despite setbacks in recent years resulting from over extending itself financially to design and build the C-Series passenger jet, which was eventually sold to Airbus.  Furthermore, Canada's economy was ranked 9th in the world compared to Sweden which was ranked 22nd.  Given these realities it begs the question, if Sweden is able to design and build their own fighter jets with a much smaller economy, tax base and aerospace sector than Canada, then what is stopping Canada from doing the same?  The simple answer seems to be political vision and will.
     

Bombardier C-Series 100

 

The 138 CF-18 Hornets that Canada purchased in 1982 were intended to defend the second largest geography in the world and meet Canada's NATO commitments.  By comparison, the SAF had over 300 front line jets operational in its arsenal during the same time period to defend a nation with a tiny fraction of Canada's geography.  Either Sweden wasted tax dollar on defence of its air space or Canada didn't spend enough on defence of its territory.

Now Canada is looking at buying even fewer replacement aircraft -- 88 to be precise -- to replace the CF-18s to defend its geography and meet its NATO obligations.  Based on Canada's NORAD and NATO defence requirements, as well as requirements to defend Canada's sovereignty from the air over the vastness of the Arctic, a fleet of only 88 aircraft is totally inadequate, and is a signal that Canadian politicians do not take defence of Canadian sovereignty over its vast territory seriously.  In addition, in a controversial decision, Canada has committed to purchasing 25 used F-18 Hornets from Australia in the interim to meet a "capability gap" resulting from the wear out, crashes and retirements of older CF-18s, which have resulted in a severely depleted RCAF fleet.

Sweden's first jet fighter was the single-engine Saab 29 Tunnan -- a single seat fighter similar in design to the Russian MIG 15 and the American F-86 Sabre.  More than 660 Tunnan's were built (some for export) and they served with the SAF from 1950-76. 

The first supersonic fighter deployed by the SAF was the single-engine, Mach 2 capable, Saab 35 Draken interceptor, which was able to operate from public highways and roads, and could be refueled and rearmed within 10-15 minutes by relatively untrained conscripts.  Canada's Avro Arrow and the French Mirage III were aircraft that were comparable.  The SAF equipped its squadrons with 474 of these jets which served with the SAF well into the 1990s.  The replacement for the Draken was the Saab 37 Viggen -- a single-engine, single seat jet capable of Mach 2.1 designed for air superiority, ground attack and reconnaissance.  This jet saw service in the SAF from 1971-2005 with over 329 being produced.
 

Saab Draken                                                                                                     Saab Viggen

 

The current front line fighter jet serving with the SAF is the Saab JAS 39 Gripen -- a single-engine, multirole jet fighter comparable in performance to the Eurofighter Typhoon, the Dassault Rafale and the MIG 29.  Over 240 Gripens have been built, and it is one of the planes in the running to replace the RCAF's fighter jet fleet.  The Swedish government has also been working aggressively with Saab to market Gripens to other European nations as well as to Brazil, India, Indonesia, Argentina, Mexico and the Philippines.

  

Saab Gripen

 

Given Canada's unique air defence needs and its vast geography, and since Canada already has a robust and competitive aerospace sector that could design and build fighter jets to meet RCAF needs if called upon, one has to question why Canada can't take a page from Sweden and follow their example of creating an industry, the main purpose of which would be to provide for its domestic air defence needs, while creating jobs and contributing to Canada's GDP in a significant manner.

Those who criticize Canadian governments for supporting a domestic aerospace industry demonstrate their lack of confidence and vision in the capability of the Canadian aerospace sector, and an unwillingness to take advantage of the innovation and ingenuity resident in Canada.  Critics also fail to realize or are unwilling to admit that Canada's air defence needs are very different from those of its allies, and therefore requires a tailor made approach.

Since there are vast areas of Canada's geography where sovereignty can only be exercised from the air, there is no excuse for Canada not producing its own fighter aircraft to equip the RCAF to meet its unique air defence needs, particularly when it has the talent, ingenuity and technological capability to do so.  Canada use to do this and the Avro Arrow was the last time that Canada took an independent approach to air defence procurement.  Had the Arrow gone into service it would have been able to exceed the performance of most of the front line jet fighters of its allies and adversaries well into the 1970s.  In addition, advances in design and technology would likely have meant that it could have continued to be a superior jet fighter into the 1980s, 90s, and possibly into the 21st century.  The absolute folly of the Diefenbaker government's decision to cancel the Arrow program is evident by the fact that the government spent far more in the subsequent decades on aircraft and missiles for Canada's air defence than the original Arrow program would have cost.  By doing so Diefenbaker seriously damaged the Canadian economy, Canada’s technological and industrial capacity, and in the process diminished the ability of Canada to defend its sovereignty.  The repercussions of that decision are still being felt more than 60 years later.

The knowledge to design, build and equip RCAF fighter squadrons in numbers that would cover Canada from east to west to north is present today and would only succeed if the federal government, supported by all political parties, and Canada's aerospace sector, came together to make this project a national priority, not only to meet Canadian defence needs, but also to create well paid, value added, high tech manufacturing jobs.

Canada suffered a huge loss in terms of industrial capability, innovation, research and development, and jobs when the Arrow was cancelled in 1959.  The impact of the loss of tens of thousands of jobs, the money that was taken out of the economy, and the talent, knowledge and ingenuity that was lost to the US and the UK aerospace sectors when engineers and designers left Canada, was incalculable.  Who knows where Canadian industry (particularly the aerospace sector) would be today if Canada had proceeded with outfitting the RCAF with the Arrow as planned?

 

The evolution of aerospace technology would have seen the Arrow evolve into something that could have gone toe to toe or even surpassed the stealth jets which are the front line fighters of the US, Russia and China.  Concepts for a 5th generation Arrow have been floated for the past decade in many social media forums, and concept designs like the illustration below could have become reality if there had been political vision to support the ingenuity of Canadian aerospace designers and engineers, and adopt a build and buy Canadian policy for the RCAF.

 

However, an opportunity exists again for Canada to be the master of its own destiny when it comes to air defence.  But only if it follows the example of Sweden, instead of being subservient to the defence priorities of the US government and the American military-industrial complex.  

Committing to designing and building a Canadian-made fighter jet would be a way to exercise sovereignty in defence procurement based on Canadian air defence needs.  It would unleash innovation that would not only benefit the defence sector but would have economic spin offs for the non-defence sector as well.  It would also instill a sense of national pride among Canadians, particularly those who know the story of the Arrow.  Finally, it would create tens of thousands of new jobs both within and outside the aerospace sector that would boost the aviation industry and the high tech sector in ways that hasn’t happened since the days when the Avro Arrow was the height of technological achievement.

Canada shouldn't turn its back on the potential that is possible if this nation does as Sweden did, and charts its own course for Canada's air defence priorities.  It has little to lose and much to gain.

© 2020 The View From Here.  © 2020 Fareed Khan.  All Rights Reserved.