2026-11-20

The ICJ has ruled that Myanmar committed genocide against the Rohingya. What’s next for international law?

The ICJ judgment against Myanmar should be remembered as the moment international law became something to be obeyed and not ignored by governments.
 
A version of this article can be found on Substack.

On November 19, 2026, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered a historic judgment in The Gambia v. Myanmar genocide case, concluding by a 9-6 vote that Myanmar had committed genocide against the Rohingya people. It was the first time in the Court's history that a state had been found directly responsible for genocide under the 1948 Genocide Convention.

For Rohingya survivors, many of whom have spent decades enduring discrimination, persecution, statelessness, violence, forced displacement, and the destruction of their communities at the hands of Myanmar authorities, the ruling represented an extraordinary moment. It was an official recognition by the world's highest court that what happened to them was not merely a humanitarian tragedy or a regrettable byproduct of conflict. It was genocide.

The decision followed years of legal proceedings initiated by The Gambia in 2019 with the backing of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and support from numerous intervening states, including Canada. The Court examined evidence relating to Myanmar's military operations in Rakhine State in 2017, operations that drove more than 700,000 Rohingya refugees across the border into Bangladesh and created the world’s largest refugee camps, with more than 1.2 million people.

In its judgment, the ICJ found that Myanmar's security forces carried out mass murder, widespread sexual violence, extreme brutality against children and women, and the complete eradication of hundreds of Rohingya communities. The Court concluded that the "only reasonable inference" from the evidence was that Myanmar acted with genocidal intent against a substantial part of the Rohingya population. The judges rejected Myanmar's argument that the campaign was merely a counter-terrorism operation directed at insurgents.

The Court further found that Myanmar failed to prevent genocide, failed to punish those responsible, and engaged in conduct designed to conceal evidence of its crimes.  Most importantly, the Court ordered a series of remedies.

Myanmar was directed to cease ongoing violations of the Genocide Convention, enact legislation consistent with its obligations, investigate and prosecute those reasonably suspected of responsibility, prevent future violations, compensate the Rohingya people for the harms inflicted upon them, and facilitate the safe, voluntary, and dignified return of displaced Rohingya to their homeland. The Court also ordered Myanmar to provide guarantees of non-repetition and undertake measures aimed at family reunification and restitution.

The ICJ left the question of reparations for a future stage of the proceedings, directing Myanmar to report back within two years on steps taken to restore the rights of Rohingya victims and to outline the amount and structure of any compensation or other forms of reparation.

For the approximately 1.2 million Rohingya refugees living in camps in Bangladesh, many born or raised entirely in exile, the judgment appeared to offer the possibility that justice might finally be accompanied by accountability.

But almost immediately after the ruling another question emerged: What next?  The ICJ can issue judgments, but it cannot enforce them.

That reality exposes one of the central contradictions of international law. The Court's judgments are final, legally binding, and without appeal. Yet the Court possesses no police force, army, or independent enforcement mechanism. If a state refuses to comply, the matter may ultimately be referred to the United Nations Security Council, where enforcement becomes subject to geopolitical calculations and political interests, and where any of the five veto nations—the United State, United Kingdom, France, China and Russia—could prevent implementation of the ICJ’s rulings by exercising their veto.

This creates an uncomfortable paradox. International law is often presented as a system of rules that govern state behaviour. Yet when the most serious crime known to humanity—genocide—is confirmed by the world's highest judicial body, implementation depends largely upon the willingness of states to act.

The question is, will they?

In response to the ICJ ruling, the United Kingdom responded quickly by expelling Myanmar's defence attaché and calling for an urgent Security Council session. Other governments welcomed the judgment and reiterated support for international law. Yet statements alone will not rebuild destroyed communities, return refugees home, compensate survivors, or dismantle the structures that enabled genocide in the first place.

The Rohingya have heard promises before and are still waiting for them to be fulfilled.

For decades they were denied citizenship, excluded from public life, subjected to discriminatory laws, and confined to conditions that numerous human rights organizations described as apartheid-like. International condemnations came and went, reports were issued, and expressions of concern multiplied. Yet the conditions that ultimately culminated in genocide remained largely intact.  That history understandably raises doubts about whether the international community will move beyond symbolic gestures.

Canada, to its credit, joined the case as an intervenor supporting The Gambia's legal effort, as did Denmark, France, Germany, The Netherlands, and the UK. The intervention reflected these nation’s longstanding public commitment to human rights and the international rule of law. Yet the question now facing Canada and the other intervenors is whether its involvement will amount to more than legal symbolism.

What concrete measures will Canada and other supporting states pursue to ensure implementation of the judgment? Will they use diplomatic pressure? Expand targeted sanctions? Restrict military cooperation? Increase humanitarian assistance? Support accountability mechanisms and criminal prosecutions? Press for Security Council action? Assist with reparations and refugee repatriation? The test of commitment begins after the cameras leave The Hague. Because if governments treat this ruling primarily as a public relations victory rather than a binding legal obligation, the Rohingya may win their case on paper while continuing to lose in reality.

The challenge becomes even more profound when viewed alongside another genocide case presently before the ICJ. During the proceedings and in reactions to the judgment, some observers noted the broader implications of the Court's reasoning for the genocide case brought by South Africa against Israel regarding Gaza. Amnesty International specifically highlighted the significance of the Court's finding that genocidal intent can coexist alongside military objectives, a clarification that may have relevance far beyond Myanmar.  The comparison is uncomfortable, but it cannot be avoided.

Canada and several other states that supported accountability for the Rohingya have adopted markedly different approaches regarding allegations of genocide by Israel against Palestinians in Gaza. Whether one agrees with that characterization or not, the disparity in political responses raises unavoidable questions about consistency.

International law derives much of its authority from the principle that it applies equally to everyone. If legal standards are applied rigorously when dealing with Myanmar but become negotiable when powerful allies are involved, the credibility of the entire system is undermined. The issue is not whether Myanmar and Israel present identical factual circumstances. They do not. The issue is whether governments genuinely believe that international legal institutions deserve respect only when their rulings are politically convenient.

The danger of selective application extends far beyond any single conflict. When states are permitted to choose which judgments to respect and which to ignore, international law gradually ceases to function as law. It becomes instead a mechanism through which the powerful discipline the weak while exempting themselves and their allies. This is precisely the perception that many communities across the Global South already hold. For them, the problem is not a lack of legal principles. The problem is inconsistent enforcement.

The Rohingya understand this reality perhaps better than anyone. They have lived through decades of declarations, resolutions, and expressions of concern while their rights were systematically stripped away. Palestinians today voice similar frustrations as international institutions struggle to halt an ongoing genocide despite repeated warnings from humanitarian organizations and legal experts.

The lesson of the Rohingya case should therefore not be limited to Myanmar. Rather, it should force governments to confront a larger question: What is the value of a legal judgment if states lack the political courage to implement it? The answer matters because the international order rests upon more than military power or economic influence. It depends upon the belief that legal norms constrain state conduct. Without that international law becomes increasingly fragile. Without enforcement, accountability becomes aspirational. Without consequences, deterrence disappears. And without deterrence, future perpetrators may reasonably conclude that political calculations will shield them from meaningful accountability.

The ICJ's judgment against Myanmar should therefore mark the beginning of a new phase rather than the conclusion of an old one. Canada and other governments that intervened in support of The Gambia have a particular responsibility. Having affirmed the Court's authority in the Rohingya case, they must now help ensure implementation of its ruling. Anything less would send a message that judgments can be celebrated without being enforced. The same principle must apply wherever credible allegations of genocide arise.

If governments genuinely support the authority of the ICJ, then support cannot be conditional upon geography, religion, ethnicity, ideology, or strategic alliances. A commitment to international law requires consistency precisely when consistency becomes politically costly. The alternative is deeply troubling and unacceptable.

A world in which ICJ judgments are ignored is a world in which international law becomes advisory rather than binding. A world in which genocide findings produce no meaningful consequences is a world in which victims receive recognition but not justice. A world in which powerful states decide when legal principles apply and when they do not is not a rules-based order at all, it is merely power politics dressed in legal language.

The Rohingya judgment offers humanity a choice. States can treat the ruling as a historic milestone and then move on, leaving hundreds of thousands of displaced Rohingya waiting indefinitely for rights, restitution, security, and return. Or they can recognize that the credibility of international law itself is now on trial.

For the 1.2 million Rohingya refugees living in Bangladesh's camps, the issue is profoundly personal. Will they ever return home? Will they recover their land, communities, and citizenship? Will they live free from persecution? Will the promises contained in the Court's judgment translate into realities on the ground?

No legal ruling alone can answer those questions. Only political action can.

If the international community fails to act after the clearest and most authoritative judicial finding possible, then the Rohingya will have received recognition without remedy. And if governments continue to invoke international law selectively, defending it in one case while ignoring it in another, they risk destroying the very system they claim to protect.

The choice ultimately comes down to this, either the rule of law governs nations, or nations govern the rule of law. The Rohingya have waited long enough to learn which it will be.

© 2026 The View From Here. © 2026 Fareed Khan. All Rights Reserved.


2026-11-16

The University of Toronto's rejection of its own anti-racism report is a moral failure and will have broad repercussions

U of T had an opportunity to lead and accept the report in principle, instead, it chose a path that many perceive as an abject failure of leadership.

By Fareed Khan
A version of this article can be found on 
Substack.

The University of Toronto has reached a moment of moral reckoning, and it has failed the test miserably.

After commissioning an extensive investigation into the experiences of Muslim, Arab and Palestinian members of its community, the university was presented with an exhaustive report with documenting patterns of discrimination, exclusion, stereotyping, surveillance, over-policing and institutional neglect. The report, Over-Policed, Under-Protected, was not the work of outside critics. It was commissioned by the University itself, produced by its own Muslim, Arab and Palestinian Discrimination Working Group, and informed by dozens of consultations and hundreds of survey responses from students, faculty, librarians and staff.

Yet when confronted with the report's findings and 57 recommendations, the University's leadership chose to reject them outright. The decision raises an uncomfortable question: would the response have been the same if the report had documented systemic discrimination against Jewish members of the campus community? It is difficult to imagine. The public outcry would have been immediate and intense. Faculty, students, alumni, politicians and media commentators would almost certainly have demanded accountability at the highest levels, with many calling for the resignation of the University's president.

The decision sends a message far more powerful than any official statement proclaiming a commitment to diversity, equity and inclusion. It tells Muslim, Arab and Palestinian students, faculty and staff that their experiences can be documented, validated, studied and acknowledged, yet still be deemed unworthy of meaningful institutional action. For many members of these communities, the rejection feels like a profound betrayal.

The University's response is particularly troubling because U of T has not fundamentally disputed the existence of anti-Muslim, anti-Arab and anti-Palestinian discrimination on its campuses. Indeed, the administration publicly acknowledged that such discrimination exists and announced a series of initiatives it says will address the problem. However, it simultaneously refused to accept the report and recommendations specifically designed to confront those realities. That contradiction and hypocrisy is impossible to ignore.

If the discrimination exists, and if the university commissioned a working group to investigate it, then the question naturally becomes: why reject the solutions proposed by the very process the University created?

Many observers see the answer in what scholars, activists and affected community members increasingly describe as the "Palestine exception." The report itself identified recurring concerns that the university's commitment to academic freedom, critical inquiry and equity appears to operate differently when Palestine is involved.

The concept is neither abstract nor theoretical. It refers to the reality that expressions of Palestinian identity, solidarity with Palestinian human rights, and criticism of Israeli government crimes against Palestinians are frequently subjected to levels of scrutiny, restriction or suspicion that comparable advocacy efforts are not. Viewed through this lens, the rejection of the report becomes even more significant.

Had a university-commissioned investigation documented systemic anti-Black racism, anti-Asian racism or antisemitism and produced detailed recommendations for reform, it would be difficult to imagine the institution dismissing the recommendations in their entirety after investing years in the process. Yet this is precisely what happened when the focus turned to Muslim, Arab and Palestinian experiences. While the reports affecting the above-mentioned communities were accepted the recent report was rejected outright. The message this sends to many students and faculty is unmistakable—discrimination against some communities demand immediate action, but those targeting Muslims, Arabs and Palestinians don’t. This is what makes the decision so damaging.

Universities are not merely educational institutions. They are communities built upon trust. Students must trust that they will be treated fairly. Faculty must trust that scholarship can be pursued without fear. Staff must trust that discrimination complaints will be handled consistently and impartially.

The findings detailed in Over-Policed, Under-Protected suggest that many Muslim, Arab and Palestinian community members at the University no longer possess that confidence. Participants described experiences of stereotyping, harassment, restrictions on speech, fears regarding professional consequences, vandalism, over surveillance and differential treatment. Some reported being associated with terrorism or subjected to degrading stereotypes merely because of their identity. Others described a chilling effect that discouraged open discussion of issues around the rights of Palestinians and their decades long struggle against Israeli oppression and occupation.

Whether every conclusion of the report is accepted by every member of the community is not the central issue. Few major anti-racism reports ever enjoy unanimous agreement. The crucial point is that a university-sponsored process documented serious concerns from hundreds of members of its own community, and the leadership of the University chose to reject it.

The consequences of the University’s decision extend far beyond the campuses spread across downtown Toronto and in Scarborough and Mississauga.

Canada's universities have increasingly become battlegrounds in debates surrounding Palestine, free expression and academic freedom. Reports and investigations from multiple institutions have raised concerns about anti-Palestinian racism, Islamophobia and anti-Arab discrimination, while student activists have repeatedly alleged unequal and discriminatory treatment when advocating for Palestinian human rights.

Reporting by The Breach in July further deepened these concerns by documenting a network through which universities across Canada reportedly shared information through a secret network and coordinated responses to pro-Palestinian student mobilization and encampments. Whether one agrees with every conclusion of that investigation or not, the revelations reinforced perceptions among many rights activists that Palestinian advocacy is frequently viewed through a security lens rather than through the traditional university values of free inquiry, debate and political engagement.

Against that backdrop, U of T's rejection of its own anti-discrimination report appears less like an isolated administrative decision and more like part of a broader pattern which has been documented elsewhere as well.

A 2025 report by York University's Islamophobia Research Hub examined incidents of Islamophobia, anti-Palestinian racism and anti-Arab racism across Canada following October 2023 and explicitly identified what researchers termed the "Palestine Exception" in institutional settings. The report described recurring examples of censorship, professional repercussions, unequal treatment and social exclusion experienced by Palestinians, Muslims and Arabs.

Whether one agrees with every conclusion in that report is beside the point. The significance lies in the consistency of the testimony emerging from different institutions, different communities and different investigations.

When students and faculty repeatedly describe the same patterns, institutions have a responsibility to listen. Instead, U of T's response risks validating the very concerns the report sought to address. The tragedy is that the University had an opportunity to lead but chose not to. It could have accepted the report in principle. It could have committed to implementing recommendations through consultation and refinement. It could have signalled that Muslim, Arab and Palestinian students deserve the same seriousness, dignity and institutional accountability afforded to all others. Instead, it chose a path that many perceive as an abject failure of leadership.

Leadership is measured not by how institutions respond when issues are easy, but by how they respond when doing the right thing is politically uncomfortable. In this instance, the University's actions have created the appearance that confronting anti-Muslim, anti-Arab and anti-Palestinian discrimination remains politically negotiable. That perception alone is deeply damaging.

The result is a growing crisis of confidence in the University's moral leadership. Students increasingly question whether their concerns will be treated equally. Faculty question whether academic freedom applies consistently. Alumni question whether the institution still embodies the principles it proudly professes.

Trust, once broken, cannot be restored through public relations statements. It is restored through accountability. The University's administration may retain legal and administrative authority, but moral authority is earned by demonstrating fairness, consistency and courage.

By rejecting a report that emerged from its own process while acknowledging many of the harms that motivated it, the University has weakened that moral authority significantly. For Muslim, Arab and Palestinian students, staff and faculty, the decision reinforces a painful perception that they remain second-class citizens in a community that celebrates inclusion in principle while practicing a form of selective oppression in reality.

That is why so many people feel angry, disappointed and betrayed, and why outrage alone is not enough. The report remains important precisely because it now exists as a public record. It documents experiences that can no longer be easily denied or ignored. Its findings will continue to provide researchers, students, advocates and policymakers with evidence and language to challenge discrimination wherever it appears. In that sense, the report's significance extends far beyond the University's refusal to embrace it.

The administration may have rejected the recommendations, but it cannot erase the testimony, the experiences documented, nor the growing body of evidence suggesting that Islamophobia, anti-Arab racism and anti-Palestinian racism continue to affect not just the University of Toronto, but other universities across Canada.

The choice of how to respond now rests with students, faculty, alumni and civil society organizations. They can accept the University's decision as the final word, or they can insist that equal treatment, equal dignity and equal protection are non-negotiable. If U of T genuinely aspires to be a place of learning, justice and human flourishing, then no community should be forced to argue for its own humanity before its concerns are taken seriously.

The University of Toronto had an opportunity to show Muslim, Arab and Palestinian members of its community that they truly belong. Instead, by rejecting its own report, it chose to deepen the very mistrust that made the report necessary in the first place.

© 2026 The View From Here. © 2026 Fareed Khan. All Rights Reserved.