It’s time for Canada to opt for Sweden’s Saab Gripen and cancel the F-35 for Canada’s air force

Saab’s industrial package makes the decision to switch to the Gripen more attractive. It proposes assembly of the aircraft in Canada, technology transfer, and a joint venture with Bombardier.

By Fareed Khan 
A version of this article can be found on Substack.

In an era of escalating tensions between Canada and the United States—marked by unjustified US tariffs, trade wars, economic coercion, and outright threats to Canadian sovereignty—Ottawa faces a pivotal decision on the replacement of the Royal Canadian Air Force’s CF-18 fighter jet fleet. The longstanding plan to acquire 88 Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II jets built in the United States has become untenable.

American diplomatic pressure, exemplified by US Ambassador Pete Hoekstra’s explicit threats about altering arrangements under the North American aerospace defence treaty, and increasing incursions into Canadian airspace by the US Air Force unless Canada fully commits to the F-35, underscores a troubling pattern of coercion. Combined with broader US actions with Canada since Donald Trump returned to office in January 2025, including tariffs that have severely impacted major Canadian industries—steel, aluminum, softwood lumber--and inflammatory rhetoric about annexing Canada as the “51st state”, a reliance on the American platform would compromise Canada’s ability to act as a master in its own house. Switching to the Swedish Saab Gripen would offer a compelling alternative with benefits that include: lower purchase and operational costs, genuine sovereignty, industrial benefits including technology transfers, and proven operational effectiveness.

Since the government of Justin Trudeau announced the finalization of the F-35 contract in 2023 the program’s costs have ballooned dramatically. Canada’s Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO) has reported that the projected life cycle cost of the F-35 purchase has surged from an original estimate of C$19 billion to C$29 billion, reflecting ongoing delays, upgrades, and sustainment overruns.

Recent incidents also highlight persistent reliability issues. Two brand-new British F-35s were stranded in the Azores for over two months due to mechanical problems during delivery flights, while another RAF F-35B was grounded in India for more than a month after a technical snag. These are not isolated anomalies but symptoms of deeper systemic challenges.

The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports since 2020 paint an even more concerning picture of chronic program failures. In its September 2025 report the GAO documented that all 110 F-35 aircraft delivered by Lockheed Martin in 2024 were late by an average of 238 days—a sharp deterioration from an already poor average of 61 days late in 2023. Supply chain challenges, parts shortages, and issues with critical hardware and software upgrades were primary drivers.

Additionally, the modernization effort known as “Block 4”—software upgrades which are the foundation of the modernization—is ineffective, has seen costs balloon by more than US$6 billion above original estimates, and is now at least five years behind schedule, with full capabilities potentially not available until 2031 or later. Over 180 airframes produced since mid-2023 have been impacted, with the new software delivering effectively zero new combat capability throughout much of 2025 in related assessments.

Sustainment costs represent another major red flag. The GAO has repeatedly highlighted rising operation and support expenses. Projected fleet sustainment costs, for the US and partner nations, now stand at US$1.58 trillion, pushing the total program life cycle cost (acquisition plus lifetime sustainment) well over US$2 trillion. Mission-capable rates for all F-35 variants have consistently fallen short of targets for years, driven by poor reliability, maintainability shortfalls, engine issues, and the very supply chain problems causing delivery delays. These challenges echo long-standing criticisms that the program continues to “over promise and under deliver” nearly two decades into the program. The Pentagon has faced criticism for downplaying the full scale of these troubles, and as a result Canada risks inheriting an aircraft platform plagued by late deliveries, incomplete capabilities, and dependency on unreliable US supply chains for parts and software updates—a vulnerability Washington would likely exploit amid disputes with Canada.

Even the F-35’s much-vaunted stealth advantage is increasingly questioned with the stealth coating peeling off in supersonic flight. Furthermore, Russia and China have developed low-frequency radars and other systems, such as Very High Frequency radar bands, infrared tracking via satellites/drones, and other developments in detection technology, which claim to detect and track F-35s at ranges that make the aircraft vulnerable. While detection does not equal successful engagement, these advances erode the first-look/first-kill advantage promised by Lockheed in contested environments, especially against peer adversaries.

By contrast, the Saab Gripen delivers superior value. Unit costs for the Gripen E version are competitive, often cited in the C$80–C$100 million range depending on configuration, compared to F-35A flyaway prices that frequently exceed C$100 million when factoring in ancillary expenses. The real savings emerge in operations. F-35 flight-hour costs are reported between C$45,500 and C$69,000, while Gripen figures range from approximately C$6,900 to C$12,400, making the Gripen as much as 4–5 times cheaper to operate on a sustained basis. Over a fleet life cycle, this translates to billions in savings for Canadian taxpayers, enabling a higher total of flight hours and better pilot training.

The Gripen’s design also emphasizes independence and practicality. It is able to operate from short, austere strips (including public highways), requires minimal support infrastructure, and can be turned around rapidly by small teams. This dispersed operations capability is ideal for Canada’s vast geography and Arctic needs, unlike the F-35’s more demanding maintenance footprint which requires longer runways, special heated hangars, and a larger support air crew with specialized training.

Additionally, the F-35 demands roughly up to 13 maintenance man-hours per hour of flight—burdened by its complex stealth coatings, specialized systems, and persistent supply chain issues—while the Saab Gripen achieves far greater efficiency with less than 10 man-hours per flight hour and significantly lower effective demands thanks to its rapid turnaround design, austere-field operability, and minimal support requirements. Crucially, sourcing from Sweden insulates Canada from US leverage over parts, software, or upgrades during political disagreements. Canada would retain full sovereignty over its air force rather than operating under implicit American veto power.

Saab’s industrial package also makes the decision to switch from the F-35 even more attractive and logical. The company has proposed assembly of the aircraft in Canada, technology transfer, and a joint venture potentially partnering with Bombardier in Montreal and Toronto. Public reports indicate this could create up to 12,600 high-skilled jobs in manufacturing, R&D, and related aerospace sectors, with significant GDP contributions and offsets meeting Canada’s 100% industrial benefits requirements. Partnerships with Bombardier, CAE (virtual training simulators), and others would build sovereign aerospace capabilities in Canada that would last decades.

Public sentiment in Canada also strongly supports re-evaluation. A number of polls, including EKOS surveys, show a majority of Canadians favouring the Gripen or a mixed fleet over sole reliance on the F-35, particularly tensions with the US. Many view the Gripen as a path to genuine independence from US control over Canada’s defence. And while critics argue a mixed fleet introduces logistical complexity, this overlooks the F-35’s own sustainment woes documented by the GAO and the Gripen’s interoperability advancements.

What hasn’t been widely reported is that Gripen platform has excelled in exercises against American fighter jets, demonstrating it can hold its own in realistic scenarios while offering far higher operational availability. In an era of drone swarms and contested airspace, quantity and affordability can complement quality. Even Elon Musk and Donald Trump have publicly criticized the F-35’s exorbitant costs, validating concerns about over-reliance on this platform.

We also have to consider the broader geopolitical context which cannot be ignored. American tariffs on Canadian goods, threats tied to border security and trade, and Ambassador Hoekstra’s statements about NORAD adjustments and increased US flights over Canada signal that Washington views allied procurement as a loyalty test rather than a sovereign decision. Continuing with the F-35 under these conditions would reward coercion and effectively make Canadian autonomy subservient to US priorities. By pivoting to the Gripen, Canada would assert control over its defence procurement, diversify suppliers, bolster domestic industry, and save substantial funds for other federal priorities.

The original F-35 commitment was made in a completely different political era—before President Trump’s tariffs, annexation rhetoric, and explicit threats against Canadian sovereignty. That era is gone. Today’s stark realities—ballooning costs confirmed by both Canada’s Parliamentary Budget Officer and the US Government Accountability Office, repeated reliability scandals, chronic delivery delays, endless modernization failures, an eroding stealth advantage, and overt American coercion—cry out for an immediate and decisive reset.

Cancelling the remaining F-35 orders in favour of the Saab Gripen would not be a retreat. It would be a bold, necessary declaration of sovereignty and fiscal responsibility. This strategic pivot would deliver affordability, operational independence, and long-term resilience while restoring Canada’s control over its own air force. It would position Canada as a proud, mature middle power charting its own destiny—capable of fulfilling its NORAD and NATO obligations without kneeling to foreign pressure or compromising its autonomy.

The time for decisive action is now. When it comes to the defence of this nation and the sacred principle of Canadian sovereignty, there can be only one answer—Canada must be the master in its own house.

© 2026 The View From Here. © 2026 Fareed Khan. All Rights Reserved.

Trump declared war on Canada upon taking office, and this country isn't prepared for the coming US invasion

The threat is not abstract or confined to some distant future, but is immediate and demands a fundamental recalibration of Canadian defence and foreign policy before it's too late. 

By Fareed Khan 
A version of this can be found on Substack. 

Since Donald Trump assumed the American presidency for his second term in January 2025, the United States has pursued a calculated campaign of economic coercion, rhetorical intimidation, and internal destabilization against Canada.  These actions amount to an undeclared war that erodes Canadian sovereignty without crossing into open military confrontation (yet).  Far from the traditional alliance built on shared defence and trade, the US-Canada relationship has been transformed into one of predation under Trump’s administration, where American power is leveraged to weaken and eventually absorb its northern neighbour. 

This is not mere speculation but a pattern evident in exorbitant tariffs on key exports, baseless accusations linking Canada to fentanyl flows into the US, allegations of Canada’s lax border insecurity, and public musings about Canada becoming the 51st state.  Regrettably the Canadian government’s hesitation in decisively and aggressively responding fuels public anxiety and highlight the urgency of the situation.

The tactics employed by Trump bear a striking resemblance to Adolf Hitler’s approach to Austria in the years leading to the 1938 Anschluss.  Hitler did not launch an immediate invasion, instead, he waged a war of nerves—a multi-year strategy of coercion, intimidation and subversion—often described as a “cold Anschluss.”  Through an aggressive propaganda campaign he portrayed Austria as a natural part of a greater German realm, funded and encouraged sympathetic factions within Austria to agitate for unification, applied economic leverage to create dependency and crisis, and issued ultimatums to the Austrian Chancellor.  This forced concessions that culminated in a rapid and essentially unopposed German troop crossing on March 12, 1938, after the Austrian government had already collapsed.  The result was a bloodless annexation that Hitler framed as inevitable and mutually beneficial.

Trump’s strategy follows a parallel script to Hitler’s.  During his speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos he made claims that Canada survives only through American benevolence, while his administration coordinates with groups advocating Alberta’s separation in a manner reminiscent of Nazi Germany's support for annexationist factions in Austria.  Punitive tariffs on automobiles, aluminum, steel, and lumber have been imposed and been increased, with explicit warnings of 100 percent tariffs should Canada pursue independent trade ties with China.  Additionally, he has made public statements have demeaning Canada's leaders by referring to former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and current PM Mark Carney “governor”, and has threatened infrastructure projects like the Gordie Howe Bridge between Windsor and Detroit, unless Canada offers concessions.  These steps systematically undermine Canada's economic stability and national cohesion, softening resistance ahead of potential absorption, just as Hitler’s incremental pressures dismantled Austrian independence and stability before the final march across the border.

Canadians themselves have registered this shift in threat perception with remarkable clarity.  Multiple independent surveys conducted in late 2025 and early 2026 reveal that a majority now consider the US as the foremost danger to national security in the eyes of the public, eclipsing long-standing concerns about China or Russia.  One Nanos poll found that 55% of respondents identified the US as the greatest security threat, making it 3.5 times more likely to be named than China, and significantly ahead of Russia at 14%. 

Another survey indicated that 49% of Canadians view the United States as the single greatest threat to world peace, outpacing Russia by 20 points.  Even more alarmingly, polling in early 2026 showed that 57. 9% of Canadians consider a direct American military invasion plausible in the near term.  These figures mark a historic reversal, because for generations, the US was seen as a dependable partner.  Today, ordinary citizens across the political spectrum express fears of economic strangulation or worse, with many reporting increased interest in personal preparedness measures in the event of an American military assault.  The polling numbers demonstrate that Canadians no longer regard traditional adversaries as the primary risk.  The clear and present danger to Canada at this time emanates from Washington DC.

Compounding the danger is the evident lack of readiness within Canadian government and public institutions to respond to a American military incursion.  Senior officials within the Carney government continue to frame bilateral ties in terms of a longstanding and unbreakable partnership, insisting on cooperation despite aggressive US measures aimed at key economic sectors and territorial claims.  Comments about defence and security prioritize ongoing NORAD and NATO operations over standalone contingency measures to the US threat, and diplomatic statements emphasize outreach efforts that overlook the long-term impact of prolonged American trade pressures and internal division tactics.  To date, no comprehensive public strategies have emerged for strengthening Canada's border with the US, prioritizing military preparedness, or implementing protective economic policies to endure extended coercion or possible military action by the US.

Of particular concern is the absence of any framework to counter a scenario in which the US applies the same approach used in Venezuela—leveraging economic and political pressures, followed by military action to orchestrate a change in leadership more aligned with Trump's agenda.  The recent US military strike and regime realignment there serve as a clear precedent for how resource-driven imperialism can force governmental change without full-scale conventional war, through sanctions, support for sympathetic factions, and strategic ultimatums.

In Canada, there are no apparent protocols to detect or neutralize comparable influence campaigns, such as the Trump regime coordinating with Alberta separatists, or amplifying calls for structural changes that could install more compliant political figures sympathetic to the US administration’s agenda.  As Adam Gordon, a visiting fellow at the Cascade Institute and former senior legal and policy adviser to Canadian foreign affairs ministers, warned in the wake of the Venezuela operation, “We can’t take off the table anymore the idea that it is at least plausible that there would be some use of force or threat of use of force, and we need to be prepared for that.”

This shortfall in Canadian preparedness propagates a dangerous complacency.  Vague statements by Carney or his ministers offer only broad assurances of national strength without specifying actionable defences for the population or key infrastructure.  Canadians are left with no evident strategy to safeguard territorial sovereignty or personal security, heightening feelings of exposure.

Experts are sounding alarms that are going unheeded, with international security scholar Aisha Ahmad of the University of Toronto stating bluntly that, “There is no political party, or leader, willing to relinquish Canadian sovereignty over economic coercion, and so if the US wanted to annex Canada, it would have to invade.” She added that, “Trump is delusional if he believes that 40 million Canadians will passively accept conquest without resistance.”

American political analyst Eric Ham echoed this in direct reference to the Venezuela precedent, calling it “a clear warning shot” for Canada and urging immediate recognition that Trump’s territorial ambitions extend northward.  Urgent steps, from expanding independent intelligence operations and securing new international partnerships to accelerating domestic production capabilities and even considering measures once unthinkable—mandatory military service, a hardened land border, acquiring nuclear weapons—are essential to avoid the fate of states that dismissed early warning signs until external forces dictated their leadership and future.

The broader international behaviour of the Trump regime underscores the gravity of the situation.  In rapid succession, the United States has launched an unprovoked war against Iran, increased the blockade of Cuba by blocking tankers from delivering essential fuel supplies, advanced explicit ambitions to assert control over Greenland and the Panama Canal under a revived hemispheric dominance doctrine, and executed military action leading to regime change in Venezuela.  These operations demonstrate a pattern of unilateral force and territorial appetite that treats smaller or neighbouring states as vassals that exist to serve the economic and security agenda of the US.

These actions illustrate that Canada is not dealing with a rational negotiating partner but a leader whose style is marked by sociopathic behaviour, erratic escalation, disregard for established norms, and a willingness to upend alliances for perceived economic and political gain.  Facing such unpredictability requires immediate recognition that traditional diplomacy with the US offers little protection, and that preparation must treat the possibility of further escalation as a realistic contingency rather than a remote hypothetical.

Independent assessments by security scholars and economists echo and amplify these concerns, consistently positioning the Trump administration as a more acute danger to Canada than either Beijing or Moscow.  Janice Gross Stein, a leading professor of conflict management at the University of Toronto, has analyzed the 2025 US National Security Strategy as a deliberate return to 19th-century spheres-of-influence thinking that explicitly challenges Canadian control over its Arctic waters and resources, framing it as incompatible with American hemispheric priorities.

Michael Devereux, an economics professor at the University of British Columbia, observes that longstanding assumptions of reliability have collapsed.  “We’ve always seen the US as a very strong and reliable ally.  That has really been undermined in the last year.”  Aaron Ettinger, a political-science professor at Carleton University, warns that bilateral ties have reached a dangerous “precipice,” where continued provocations risk irreversible damage to sovereignty and economic stability. 

These voices, drawn from academic and policy circles, converge on a sobering conclusion—the US threat is not abstract or confined to some distant future, but is immediate and structural, demanding a fundamental recalibration of Canadian defence and foreign policy before it's too late.

All the evidence available since Trump took office in 2025—from targeted economic sabotage and propaganda mirroring pre-Anschluss Austria, through public opinion data that now ranks the US as the top security threat above all other powers, the administration’s record of aggressive interventions elsewhere, to the absence of credible Canadian defensive planning—paints a coherent picture of hostile intent towards a nation that has been America’s closest friend, neighbour, biggest trading partner, and strongest ally.

In the face of what is on the horizon Canadians cannot afford denial or delay.  The window for building resilience, forging new alliances, and hardening national defences is narrowing.  History shows that nations which fail to confront incremental aggression early pay a far higher price later.  The time to acknowledge the reality and act decisively is now, before Trump’s rhetoric becomes reality and economic blackmail gives way to something far more dangerous and violent.

© 2026 The View From Here. © 2026 Fareed Khan. All Rights Reserved.